Loose the Bonds of Wickedness

May 17, 2010
 Yesterday, my friend Byron preached a fantastic sermon on Isaiah 58, a remarkable passage that I was startled to find that I didn’t remember ever noticing it or having heard it before.  Just goes to show how rarely we are ever led to consider those passages that smack of liberation theology.  This passage is particularly challenging in its rejection of the “worship first, justice later” paradigm that is so prevalent in our circles, as it is unsettling to note that the worship being condemned is genuine heartfelt worship, not hypocrisy or empty show.  The passage was so striking, I thought I would post verses 1-11 here:

1 “Cry aloud, spare not;

      Lift up your voice like a trumpet; 

      Tell My people their transgression, 

      And the house of Jacob their sins. 

       2 Yet they seek Me daily, 

      And delight to know My ways, 

      As a nation that did righteousness, 

      And did not forsake the ordinance of their God. 

      They ask of Me the ordinances of justice; 

      They take delight in approaching God. 

       3 ‘ Why have we fasted,’ they say, ‘and You have not seen? 

      Why have we afflicted our souls, and You take no notice?’ 

      “ In fact, in the day of your fast you find pleasure, 

      And exploit all your laborers. 

       4 Indeed you fast for strife and debate, 

      And to strike with the fist of wickedness. 

      You will not fast as you do this day, 

      To make your voice heard on high. 

       5 Is it a fast that I have chosen, 

      A day for a man to afflict his soul? 

      Is it to bow down his head like a bulrush, 

      And to spread out sackcloth and ashes? 

      Would you call this a fast, 

      And an acceptable day to the LORD? 

       6 “ Is this not the fast that I have chosen: 

      To loose the bonds of wickedness, 

      To undo the heavy burdens, 

      To let the oppressed go free, 

      And that you break every yoke? 

       7 Is it not to share your bread with the hungry, 

      And that you bring to your house the poor who are cast out; 

      When you see the naked, that you cover him, 

      And not hide yourself from your own flesh? 

       8 Then your light shall break forth like the morning, 

      Your healing shall spring forth speedily, 

      And your righteousness shall go before you; 

      The glory of the LORD shall be your rear guard. 

       9 Then you shall call, and the LORD will answer; 

      You shall cry, and He will say, ‘Here I am.’ 

      “ If you take away the yoke from your midst, 

      The pointing of the finger, and speaking wickedness, 

       10 If you extend your soul to the hungry 

      And satisfy the afflicted soul, 

      Then your light shall dawn in the darkness, 

      And your darkness shall be as the noonday. 

       11 The LORD will guide you continually, 

      And satisfy your soul in drought, 

      And strengthen your bones; 

      You shall be like a watered garden, 

      And like a spring of water, whose waters do not fail. 

       12 Those from among you 

      Shall build the old waste places; 

      You shall raise up the foundations of many generations; 

      And you shall be called the Repairer of the Breach, 

      The Restorer of Streets to Dwell In.”

The Essay on the Restoration of Property

March 11, 2010

Hilaire Belloc’s Essay on the Restoration of Property is a fantastic paradigm-rocker.  In it, he sets forth the shocking, but ultimately quite sensible claim that, far from being opposites, capitalism and socialism are essentially of the same genus; socialism just takes capitalism a bit further--to it’s logical conclusion.  How could this be?  Because both are the rejection of private property.  But wait, hold on a minute--I thought capitalism was all in favor of private property.  Well, not really.  With the rise of modern capitalism, the possession of real, productive property, which was once widely distributed among the majority of the population, was rapidly concentrated in the hands of a small minority of the population, leaving very few small proprietors and producers, and enslaving most of those that remained to the control of banks.  Socialism is simply taking the next step--if we’ve already dispossessed most people, and concentrated the means of production in the hands of a few, let’s just go ahead and concentrate them in the hands of one entity that is at least looking out for the welfare of everyone.  

The result, of course, in either case, is loss of freedom: 

“The possessors alone remain to enjoy economic freedom, the disposessed--the very great majority--are deprived of it; but there is already at least security of some revenue for nearly all, and there can, with proper organization, be sufficiency for all as well.  The only good lost to the masses, if it be a good, is freedom.  For in such a state of society (the Servile State) the determining note is lack of freedom: the determing mass of society have no experience of economic liberty.  The master class directs and is free: but society thinks and acts in terms of wage earners.  The masses are kept alive, they are taught by a subsidy in childhood, treated by a subsidy in illness, and maintained by a subsidy in old age, widowhood and incapacity from accident.  Soon no one of them may be suffering either hunger or cold or lack of any plain material necessity consonant to the type of civilization in which they live.  But their activities are at the mercy of their masters.” 

In other words, we, who pride ourselves in living in such a very free society, faced with the prospect of boundless choice, are actually like hamsters, so long confined to their cage and fattened by indolence that their hopes, horizons, and imagination have shrunk to the point that they imagine themselves to be living in a paradise of free entertainments, and can wish for nothing more than their prefab food pellets.

The solution, of course (and here Belloc has the Old Testament clearly on his side, although he doesn’t use it--indeed, the almost total lack of reference to Scripture or Church in this book was a big weakness) is to structure one’s economy such that property is once again widely distributed, and big producers are prevented from devouring small producers, so that we have a society of genuinely free men no longer alienated from the products of their labor.

Belloc is eloquently pessimistic about whether this is feasible: 

“Respect for reality compels me to say that the Restoration of Property when that institution has all but disappeared is a task almost impossible of achievement.  If it were quite impossible of achievement it would not be worth while wasting breath or ink upon it.  It is not quite impossible of achievement; at least, it is not quite impossible to start the beginnings of a change.  But the odds against a reconstruction of economic freedom in a society which has long acquired the practice and habit of wage slavery is difficult beyond any other political task.  I do not know whether it be possible to start even the beginnings of a change.  I doubt heavily that it is possible to plant successfully even the small seedlings of economic freedom in our society, here, in England, today.  What I certainly know is that, failing such a change, our industrial society msut necesarily end in the restoration of slavery.  The choice lies between property on the one hand and slavery, public or private, on the other.  There is no third issue.”

Belloc insists that the rise of modern capitalism was by no means a social or economic necessity: “It is not true that capitalism arose inevitably from the necessary development of economic institutions under the doctrine of private proprty.  Capitalism arose only after the safeguards guaranteeing well-distributed private property had been deliberately broken down by an evil will insufficiently resisted.”  But, on the other hand, he does not thereby believe that the market, left to itself, will continue in an idyllic state of freedom and equality: “once restored, Property must be constantly sustained or it will lapse again into Capitalism.  Private property acting unchecked, that is, in the absence of all safeguards for the preservation of the small man’s independence, tends inevitably to an ultimate control of the means of production by a few; that is, in economics, to Capitalism, and therefore, in politics, to plutocracy.”  

Here is the reconciliation of these two statements--“Though it is true that unchecked competition must ultimately produce the rule of ownership by a few, yet it is also true that mankind has always felt this to be the danger, has instinctively safeguarded itself against that danger by the setting up of institutions for the protection of small property, and that these institutions have never broken down of themselves, but always and only under the conscious action of a deliberately hostile attack.”  

Probably the strongest section in the book is his account of the seven reasons why the market, unfettered, will tend toward increasing centralization: 1) overhead charges; the larger an organization, up to a very considerable size at least, the lower its overhead costs will generally be, proportionately.  One can administer ten thousand retail stores under a single corporation for a much lower average cost than ten thousand men can administer ten thousand independent retail stores.  2) Information.  The larger an organization, its ability to publicize itself will be exponentially greater (there’s some great remarks on the evils of advertising in this section).  3) The power to obtain credit: a larger entity can get credit much more easily, at much lower rates of interest, and can continue to hold a line of credit even when insolvent, because the lenders are afraid of letting it collapse.  4) Underselling.  We all know this phenomenon with Wal-mart; the bigger organization sells at a loss for a while in order to drive the smaller competition out of business.  5) Ease of accumulating capital.  This one’s a bit more complicated, but the essence is that a big wealthy organization can afford to set aside money to accumulate capital much more easily than a small producer.  6) Political influence.  The large organization can easily put all sorts of pressure on a parliamentary political system to enact laws and policies friendly to it.  7) Judicial influence.  The larger organization can often afford to take legal advantage of the smaller organization, because the latter simply cannot afford the costs of carrying on a court case, even one they ought to win.  (It’s particularly remarkable that Belloc had already noted this danger in 1936, a danger that has spiralled out of control since.)

There is, however, a weakness in the book, and that is that Belloc’s pessimism about seeing this restoration of property mean that he rests what little hope he has on the State.  This is odd, given that he sees so clearly the collusion of state and big business, and even says at the end, “Parliaments are necessarily the organs of plutocracy.  There is no approach through them whereby the small man can have effect in the economic field.”  Apparently he hopes for the ending of the Parliamentary system of government, being convinced that monarchy is much more favorable to distributism.  Early on, he seems to say that a top-down fix is not the answer: “The evil has gone so far that, though the preaching of a new doctrine is invaluable, the creation of new and effective immediate machinery is impossible.  The restoration of Property must essentially be the product of a new mood, not of a new scheme.  It must grow from seed planted in the breast.  It is too late to reinfuse it by design, and our effort must everywhere be particular, local, and in its origins, small.”  

But later on, he explicitly rejects the idea that the solution is to be found in changing the philosophy, the religion, of the society; it’s too late for that, he says.  If anything is to be done, it will have to be done soon, and resolutely.  “No such reformation as we are contemplating can be undertaken or continued without State power....We shall find as we proceed in our search for Economic Freedom, that we cannot follow it for any distance without calling in the powers of the State, to contrast with, and as far as possible to destroy, the usurped powers of Big Business.”

To this end, he recommends a system of differential taxation, carefully calculated to make life more difficult for the big producer and easier for the small producer.  “It will be objected, of course,” he says, “that for such a system you would need an extension of bureaucracy, that the definition of the various categories will be difficult, etc.  It is true that in all these reforms we shall have to extend, for the moment, bureaucratic action.  The nature of the modern world is such that we cannot escape from being helped by the State in our reforms.”

In general, he would prefer to avoid State ownership, but says that it will be necessary in certain situations.  Repeatedly he speaks of the need for the State to artificially foster the isolated and feeble seedlings of small property ownership at the expense of the rest of society, and is unapologetic about what this requires: “You cannot start a new peasantry save at the expense of the diseased society surrounding it; and if you are not prepared to impose that sacrifice your peasantry will never be established.  It must begin as a social luxury, and, while it remains in that initial ‘luxury’ stage, it must like all luxuries, be extravagantly paid for.”

Now, I am perhaps not so opposed in principle to all of this as you might think.  If the government is responsible for administering justice and providing for the common good, and there is indeed a serious structural injustice, one that the government helped create, then there is certainly something to be said for having the government go to work to undo the harm it did, and “artificially” restore a juster order.  I am certainly not wholeheartedly in favor of that proposition, but I could seriously entertain it.  But on a pragmatic level, I have deep doubts.  If it be true, as Belloc recognizes clearly, that governments, at least of the sort we now have to reckon with, are almost chronically unable to avoid getting in bed with big corporations, how could we genuinely trust them with such a project?  In this irreligious and secular age, how can we hope that more corruption, rather than more care for their citizens, will be the end result?  And, if society as a whole is screwed up, how will a top-down imposition work?  It will simply prompt an uprising by the monied interests, who will use all the means at their disposal to bring the government back under their control; plus, it simply will not take root among a citizenry indisposed to take on the responsibilities of real property-ownership.  

Personally, I think Distributism’s best chance for success lies in being “particular, local, and in its origins, small,” in particular, focusing on local church initiatives.  Church communities and denominations, if they’re really serious about these ideals, can go a long way to nourishing free, just, well-distributed economic organizations in their midst.  Of course if the State really desires to help out in some way, they should rejoice, but they shouldn’t put too much hope there.  It will be a long, slow, hard process of swimming upstream, but it seems more likely to pay off in the long run.  

Charity and Justice--A Catholic Conundrum

March 11, 2010

One of the most fundamental problems in the political and economic theology is the relationship between charity and justice..  This is not just some academic quibble over terms, but has potentially huge practical significance.  Traditionally, justice has been designated as the responsibility of the state, and charity of the Church.  But if we’re going to divide things up so neatly, we’d better have a clear idea of the distinction.  On this issue of giving, the theft vs. stinginess issue I touched on in a recent post, the distinction looms very large.  For, if stinginess is always a failure of charity only, not of justice, then it is outside the reach of the law; states have no business taxing people in order to give their money to others, or penalizing people for greed, or any of that.  But if it's a failure of justice, then presumably (assuming we've rightly assigned the task of the "state," and assuming we've rightly figured out what the "state" is--ha!) we're permitting grave injustice when we don't have laws regulating the acquisition and distribution of wealth.  Unfortunately, the tradition does not give us as clear an answer as we would like on this crucial question.

The typical distinctions between duties of justice and duties of charity rest on one of two shaky foundations.  The first is the claim that whereas duties of justice are obligatory, duties of charity are voluntary and optional.  To use an example from my recent post, you have an obligation not to steal from someone, but the charitable action of giving to someone cannot be made so obligatory.  The second route is to say that while in either case you have an obligation to act in a certain way, in one case the obligation is met by an answering right or claim in the other party, while in the other case it is not.  So, for example, I may have an obligation to give to both the needy stranger and to repay the friend who lent me $10,000 last year.  But in the first case, the friend has a right to expect the money, a claim upon me; in the latter, the needy stranger does not.  If we act like the needy stranger does, then we have all the evils of the modern welfare system, where the poor treat their stipends as “entitlements” and lose any sense of gratitude.  

The first foundation for the distinction I think we can safely dispense with.  Duties of charity are duties, not suggestions.  “You shall love your neighbor as yourself” and all that it entails, is about as obligatory as you can get.  I do not recall encountering any moral theologian that argues otherwise.  However, charity is “voluntary” in the sense that it is not compelled by physical coercion, at least on the basis of the standard division between charity as the province of the Church and justice of the State.  If the State does not enforce charity, then by definition it is voluntary in that sense.  But, having then ascertained that it is “voluntary,” we sometimes have a tendency to get fuzzy with definitions, and act as if that means, “entirely up to my choice,” which it is not, ethically speaking.  We also see a desire to emphasize Christian liberty over against legalism coming in here.  To talk about obligations, we are afraid, steers us into the realm of legalism.  Much better to talk about privileges--we have the privilege to give, not the obligation.  Perhaps something is gained by this way of speaking, but I fear that more is lost.

The second foundation has a venerable pedigree in moral theology, and it seems to make neat and perfect sense, but I spot a problem that makes it all very hazy for me.  What is this language of rights?  Many theologians have been leery of the language of rights, and recently, the O’Donovans have been the most notorious opponents of the idea, insisting that the language of rights has a troubled and checkered history, spotted with many theological ambiguities, and we would do much better to go back to the language of obligations based on objective Right, rather than subjective rights.  But what does this mean for the charity/justice distinction?  If there’s no such thing as rights, but only obligations, then we can’t distinguish justice by saying that in the case of justice, there’s an answering right that is absent in the case of charity.  Don’t the two now start to slide together?  (I had best mention, also, that much of my ambiguity regarding this distinction stems from the fact that it seems almost invisible in Old Testament law and ethics, at least, the parts I have been studying.)

Now, presumably there’s another foundation for the distinction of duties of charity and duties of justice, because it goes back to before the advent of rights language, and is clearly present in Aquinas.  Yet, major ambiguities are present there, particularly on this issue of theft and generosity.  Aquinas, as I mentioned in a recent post, acknowledges that withholding charity from another in need is tantamount to theft, a violation of justice.   The duty to give, in the case of one who is in great need, is a duty of justice, it seems clearly in this passage.  However, when you go to look for the treatment of the duties of giving, it is found in his section on charity.  Yet within this section, Aquinas seems still to be designating the duty of giving to one in great need, and the duty of giving all of your superflua (anything you have that exceeds the full extent of your reasonable needs), as one of strict justice (at least, such is the reading of John Finnis, who offers one of the most thorough and authoritative analyses of this section).  Of course, there is still a kind of giving (e.g., giving to another in need when you yourself are also in need) that is supererogatory, and thus voluntary and a matter of charity.  But here we see that charity suddenly crops up again as the voluntary, rather than the obligatory.  

This ambiguity continued to vex the Catholic moral tradition.  In his Philosophy of Politics, Anthony Rosmini draws the distinction between justice and charity in this sphere as tightly as possible, in good libertarian language, 

“We know that charity and beneficence can be commanded by God, but we contradict the proper notion of the duties of humanity and charity if we have the right to demand the practice of beneficence and to regulate it by law as we please.  Such action would result in endless disputes and squabbles and even cause terrible wars which could end only in the destruction of the system of humanity.  If individuals themselves cannot require from their equals, as a right of justice, what pertains to beneficence, much less can a government, which is principally instituted to defend and preserve the right of all the individuals that compose the society.  If I am harmed by someone attempting to force a benefit from me, my right is violated, and the government must help me against those who violently attack me in this way.  Clearly, a government which protects unjust and violent people is forcefully obliging me to do what in fact depends totally on my will and on the extent of my inclination to be beneficent.  Not even civil society as a whole can change the natural duties of charity into duties of justice, nor all the members united together require one person to give, out of justice, what he is obliged (I am presuming he is obliged) to give out of affection.  Otherwise, love would not be love, and beneficence, not beneficence.”

In Leo XIII’s encyclical, Rerum Novarum, the same issue crops up:

“But if the question be asked: How ought man to use his possessions? the Church replies without hesitation: ‘As to this point, man ought not regard external goods as his own, but as common so that, in fact, a person should readily share them when he sees others in need....’  [W]hen the demands of necessity and propriety have been met, it is a duty to give to the poor out of that which remains. ‘Give that which remains as alms.’ These are duties not of justice, except in cases of extreme need, but of Christian charity, which obviously cannot be enforced by legal action. But the laws and judgments of men yield precedence to the law and judgment of Christ the Lord, Who in many ways urges the practice of almsgiving: ‘It is more blessed to give than to receive,’ and Who will judge a kindness done or denied to the poor as done or denied to himself.”

Notice that Leo leaves an exception--in “cases of extreme need,” in which case, we presume, these duties of charity are transformed into duties of justice, and are thereby enforceable by legal action.  Or is that not what he means?  (It is worth pointing out, for those interested in such niceties, that Leo’s exception is much smaller than St. Thomas’s.  For Thomas, after “the demands of necessity and propriety have been met,” we are talking about one’s superflua, all of which must be given to the poor as a matter of justice.  For Thomas, “cases of extreme need” transform duties of charity into duties of justice even when the giver’s needs “of propriety” have not been met [e.g., if I “need” to buy a bus ticket to get to work, and I meet someone in desperate need of food, I have a duty of justice to sacrifice my bus ticket for their food].  Needless to say, I tend to be more sympathetic to Thomas than Leo on this question.)  I have been told (though I have not yet read this myself) that the way Leo handled this question was not considered entirely satisfactory in the Catholic Social Teaching tradition, and was reversed by John Paul II in Laborem Exercens, where he claimed that the withholding of property that ought to be given to another was "an offense before God and man." (An offense before man is presumably a matter for the justice system.)

If any of you were hoping for a solution of the dilemma at this point, I’m afraid I must disappoint you.  Like much else on this blog, this is merely an exploration of the problem.  Perhaps a solution will come to me in a vision this evening as I smoke my pipe, something I haven’t done in much too long.  (I also note that while I have analyzed the Catholic tradition on this issue, I have said nothing about how Protestants handle these matters.  If anyone wants to jump in and add that to the discussion, that’d be splendid.)

HOPE for Haiti? Disaster Capitalism Strikes Again

An AP article yesterday entitled "Can low-paying garment industry save Haiti?" highlights how depressingly hypocritical US commitment to helping Haiti really is.  Using the quake as an opportunity to kick into high gear a plan formulated last year, the UN, Obama administration, and American business community are planning to expand the sweatshop industry as a means of helping Haiti's economy recover from the disaster.  

Yes, you heard that right--more sweatshops to help the Haitian people...typical American solution.  The industry in Haiti currently pays a wage of $3.09 a day, having refused to accept a law last year that had tried to peg the minimum wage at a bounteous $5 a day.  (The clothes sewed, incidentally, are no Wal-mart brands, but sell for $550 a pop at stores like Jos. A. Bank.)  At this wage rate, employees can pay for the barest food and, if they're lucky, shelter, and no more; indeed, they must miss out on the free food handouts that are currently available because they're kept at work all day.  

Nevertheless, Bill Clinton, currently serving as a "special envoy" to the nation, promised that "The rich will get richer, but there will be a much, much bigger middle class, with poor people pouring into it at a rapid rate."  The theory, of course, is that eventually, all these folks will save up enough money from their meager wages that they can spend more, encouraging more industries, and thus more wages, and they'll be able to acquire more skills, and thus command higher wages, and so on.  The problem, of course, is that the wages are so low that nobody has anything left over to save or invest, and the population is so desperate and unemployed that those wages won't be rising anytime soon.  In fact, in the last twenty-five years, real wages have fallen by 50% at these factories!   No one has poured into the middle class from sweatshop work; rather, the poor and desperate have simply sunk even deeper into poverty and desperation.    

Nevertheless, a year and a half ago, the US Congress passed an act called the "Haiti Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act" or "Hope II," giving Haitian sweatshops completely tariff-free access to US markets, to try to encourage more US clothing companies to outsource their labor there.  Of course, the lifting of such barriers does nothing to raise wages, but simply boosts factory profit margins, which now average 22%! 

I recall Rerum Novarum's indispensable dictum:

"If through necessity or fear of a worse evil the workman accept harder conditions because an employer or contractor will afford him no better, he is made the victim of force and injustice."

Leo on Labor Justice

February 17, 2010

"If through necessity or fear of a worse evil the workman accept harder conditions because an employer or contractor will afford him no better, he is made the victim of force and injustice."

This concept from Rerum Novarum, blindingly obvious but almost wholly obscured by a century and a half of capitalist ideology, expresses perfectly what I spent more than a year struggling to express, recognizing that something like this must be true, but so indoctrinated that it was impossible to see it clearly.  Here's the full context for that statement in the encyclical--great stuff:

"43. We now approach a subject of great importance, and one in respect of which, if extremes are to be avoided, right notions are absolutely necessary. Wages, as we are told, are regulated by free consent, and therefore the employer, when he pays what was agreed upon, has done his part and seemingly is not called upon to do anything beyond. The only way, it is said, in which injustice might occur would be if the master refused to pay the whole of the wages, or if the workman should not complete the work undertaken; in such cases the public authority should intervene, to see that each obtains his due, but not under any other circumstances.

44. To this kind of argument a fair-minded man will not easily or entirely assent; it is not complete, for there are important considerations which it leaves out of account altogether. To labor is to exert oneself for the sake of procuring what is necessary for the various purposes of life, and chief of all for self preservation. "In the sweat of thy face thou shalt eat bread." Hence, a man's labor necessarily bears two notes or characters. First of all, it is personal, inasmuch as the force which acts is bound up with the personality and is the exclusive property of him who acts, and, further, was given to him for his advantage. Secondly, man's labor is necessary; for without the result of labor a man cannot live, and self-preservation is a law of nature, which it is wrong to disobey. Now, were we to consider labor merely in so far as it is personal, doubtless it would be within the workman's right to accept any rate of wages whatsoever; for in the same way as he is free to work or not, so is he free to accept a small wage or even none at all. But our conclusion must be very different if, together with the personal element in a man's work, we consider the fact that work is also necessary for him to live: these two aspects of his work are separable in thought, but not in reality. The preservation of life is the bounden duty of one and all, and to be wanting therein is a crime. It necessarily follows that each one has a natural right to procure what is required in order to live, and the poor can procure that in no other way than by what they can earn through their work.

45. Let the working man and the employer make free agreements, and in particular let them agree freely as to the wages; nevertheless, there underlies a dictate of natural justice more imperious and ancient than any bargain between man and man, namely, that wages ought not to be insufficient to support a frugal and well-behaved wage-earner. If through necessity or fear of a worse evil the workman accept harder conditions because an employer or contractor will afford him no better, he is made the victim of force and injustice."